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A Comparative View of the Law of
Trademarked Generic Words
By RALPH H. FOLSOM
D., Yale Law School, 1972; LLM., London University, 1973; Professor of
Law, University of San Diego.
and LARRY L. TEPLY
D., Universiy ofFlorida, 1972;LLM., HarvardLaw School, 1973;Profes-
sor of Law, Creighton University.
Legal systems in a large number of jurisdictions enforce exclusive
rights to words claimed as trademarks.' Sound economic reasons un-
derlie this widespread and ordinarily perpetual protection.2 Properly
functioning trademarks reduce distribution and transaction costs by
providing a shorthand means of distinguishing the products of one pro-
ducer from those of another.3 Furthermore, by encouraging manufac-
turers to maintain a constant quality level for goods sold under a
particular mark,4 such trademarks reduce consumer search costs5 by
eliminating the need to make repeated inquiries regarding product
quality.' Finally, trademarks aid in creating consumer demand by fa-
1. More than 130 jurisdictions provide for trademark registration. Common-law pro-
tection of unregistered marks is also available in a number of countries. See 1 J. GI.SON,
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 9.01, at 9-2 (1980); TRADEMARKS THRoUG1t-
OUT THE WORLD (A. Greene ed. 1981).
2. See generally Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic lVords, 89 YALE LJ. 1323,
1333-46 (1980) (discussing economic aspects of trademarks).
3. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFOt-
ANCE 327 (1970).
4. See Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1336 & n.77 (explaining the incentives).
5. In addition to the cost of time and transportation required to purchase a product
and the actual price paid, the total product cost includes the cost of prepurchase "search"
activities whereby consumers acquire knowledge of the location of sales outlets, comparative
prices, viable substitutes, and product quality. Id at 1334-35. See generally Nelson, Infor-
mation and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL ECON. 311 (1970); Stigler, The Economicr ofInfor-
mation, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
6. Scherer illustrates these savings with the simple example of the "conscientious
housewife" who would otherwise "have to make repeated inquiries about products suscepti-
ble to quality or taste variations, asking whether a particular product was good, what its
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cilitating product advertising. 7
While these economic benefits justify protecting the numerous
properly functioning trademarks,8 legal systems providing such protec-
tion face two common problems. First, a properly functioning trade-
mark may degenerate into a generic word that identifies a product
genus, ie., a product class or type, not merely its source. 9 Second, a
manufacturer may attempt to remove an existing generic product name
from the public domain by extensive use, advertising, and association
of that name with the manufacturer.' 0
In both instances, conflicting policy considerations arise when the
trademark claimant seeks to enforce exclusive rights to the mark in
question. On one hand, it seems unfair to deprive the trademark claim-
ant of the goodwill that has come, often at great expense, to be associ-
ated with the mark." To the extent that consumers rely on the mark
for source significance, their expectations will be frustrated if use of the
mark is not protected from encroachment by competing sellers. Con-
sumers will also suffer an economic loss if they mistakenly purchase a
competitor's product that is of an inferior quality, sells for a higher
price, or both. On the other hand, when a seller's exclusive mark func-
tions generically, consumers may be confused and unable to effectively
identify marketplace alternatives. In some circumstances, consumers
distinguishing characteristics were, and perhaps . . . whether she might try a sample." F.
SCHERER, supra note 3, at 327.
7. Product advertising and other promotional activities provide, interalia, information
about anticipated experiences and product quality. By intimately tying trademarks into
such advertising, buyers have a ready means of identifying products that have the desired
advertised characteristics. See I J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 3:5, at 96 (1973).
8. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODEI
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1274, 1275 (summarizing the economic benefits justifying federal regis-
tration and protection of trademarks in the United States). See also Lunsford, Consumers
and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Market Place, 64 TRADE-MARK RE.
75, 95 (1974).
9. See generally L. HOLMQVIST, DEGENERATION OF TRADE MARKS (1971) (discussing
degeneration under French, German, English, American, and Nordic trademark law).
10. See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, g" 12:2, at 409-10; 1 J. GILSON, supra note 1,
§ 2.09[2], at 2-84, -85 (discussing such attempts under United States law).
11. Such a concern is frequently mentioned in the case law. See, e.g., King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963) ("No doubt [holding an
originally valid trademark as being generic] can be. . .harsh.., for it places a penalty on
a manufacturer who has made skillful use of advertising and has popularized his product");
Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 848 (C.C.P.A. 1961)
("[It is] distressing to contemplate a situation in which money has been invested in a promo-
tion [of a generic word] in the mistaken belief that trademark rights of value are being
created"). See also infra note 119 (justification of "protective" provisions of British trade-
mark law).
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may be reluctant to risk buying a product when the familiar trade-
marked generic word or words do not appear on the package or the
product. 2 Competitors may thereby be placed at a significant disad-
vantage.' 3 To the extent that either the seller is relieved from compet-
ing on the merits of the products or market entry is discouraged, the
trademark holder may be able to reduce its advertising and promo-
tional expenditures, maintain a price premium, or hold a larger market
share, all ordinarily to the detriment of consumers.' 4
In this Article, we compare the approaches to these problems
taken by the United States and four Commonwealth countries--the
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.' 5 Because of
their common heritage, each of these jurisdictions has addressed
problems associated with trademarked generic words in a similar con-
text. Exclusive rights to many of the same trademarks have been liti-
gated in the United States and one or more of the other countries,' 6 yet
these jurisdictions have evolved remarkably different common-law and
statutory solutions to genericness issues. These contrasting solutions
are critiqued in light of the comparative insights gained from this anal-
ysis. This critique is also based, in part, on our prior work on the eco-
nomic aspects of trademarked generic words, a study of the law of the
United States.17
12. Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1340-43.
13. Id at 1344-46.
14. Id at 1358.
15. "Commonwealth" in subsequent references should be taken to mean, for purposes
of the discussion in this Article, the law of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand.
16. See, ag., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) ("Aspirin"
generic in U.S.); Bayer Co. v. American Druggists' Syndicate, Ltd., 1924 S.C.R. 558 ("Aspi-
rin" valid in Canada); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) ("Shredded
Wheat" generic in U.S.); Canadian Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg Co. of Canada, [1938] 1
All E.R. 618 (P.C.) (Can.) ("Shredded Wheat" generic in Canada); Shredded Wheat Co. v.
Kellogg Co. of Gr. Brit., 1939 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 137 (H.L.) ("Shredded Wheat" generic in
Britain); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) ("Ther-
mos" generic in U.S.); Aladdin Indus. v. Canadian Thermos Prods. Ltd., [196912 Can. Exch.
80 ("Thermos" valid in Canada); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896)
("Singer" generic in U.S.); Singer Mfg. Co. v. British Empire Mfg. Co., 1903 R.P.D. & T.M.
Cas. 313 (Ch.) ("Singer" valid in Britain); Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir.), cer. denied, 314 U.S. 629 (1941) ("Cola" generic in U.S.); Coca-Cola
Co. of Canada v. Pepsi-Cola Co. of Canada, [1942] 2 D.LR. 657 (P.C.) ("Cola" generic in
Canada).
17. See Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, reprinted in 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 206 (1980)
and I NAT'L L. REV. REP. 1765 (1980). See also Swann, The Economic Approach to Generi-
cisn A Reply to Folsom and Teply, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 243 (1980); Swann, Economic
Implications of Genericism, in PRACTISING LAW INST., CouRSE HANDBOOK No. 141, GE-
NERIc TRADEMARKS 245 (1981).
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I. COMMON-LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Unfair competition, "passing off," and trademark infringement ac-
tions' 8 underwent a critical period of development during the nine-
teenth century in England. 9 The common law of trademarked generic
words was derived from these actions. These origins strongly influ-
enced the manner in which the courts have addressed genericness is-
sues and balanced conflicting interests.
A. Property Rights, Prevention of Fraud, and the Protection of
Good Will
In the leading 1824 case of Sykes v. Sykes, 0 the Court of King's
Bench permitted a damage recovery at common law when the defend-
ant marked its goods with the plaintiffs trademark, thereby fraudu-
lently inducing the public to suppose the articles were manufactured by
the plaintiff. The defendant had sold the articles to retailers with the
express purpose that they be resold deceptively.2' Later, in 1833, the
Court of King's Bench held that a plaintiff did not have to prove that
special damage had been suffered nor that the goods sold by the in-
fringer were inferior in order to recover damages in a common-law
trademark action.22 Based upon these and subsequent cases, the com-
mon law firmly established a right of action for trademark infringe-
ment, with fraud as an essential element.23
Equity courts began to restrain trademark infringement at about
the same time, but developed a different basis for intervention. 4 In the
18. "Passing off," which is sometimes referred to as "palming off," traditionally was
defined as selling a product as the product of another by means of similar labels, packaging,
or advertising. More recent definitions limit passing off to the unauthorized substitution of
one manufacturer's goods when another's goods have been ordered by a customer. Trade-
mark infringement refers to the unlawful appropriation of another's symbol used to identify
and distinguish a seller's goods. Both are now considered to be species of a broader class of
activities labeled "unfair competition." Unfair competition includes such matters as theft of
trade secrets, use of similar corporate, business, or professional names, false advertising, use
of confidential information by a former employee, and other forms of misappropriation or
competitive unfairness. See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 1:5, 1:7.
19. See generally F. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELAT-
ING TO TRADE-MARKS 134-43 (1925); T. BLANCO WHITE & R. JACOB, KERLY'S LAW oft
TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES §§ 1-03 to 1-05 (10th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
KERLY].
20. 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (K.B. 1824).
21. Id at 835.
22. Blofeld v. Payne, 110 Eng. Rep. 509, 510 (K.B. 1833).
23. See KERLY, supra note 19, § 1-05.
24. Id §§ 1-03, 1-05.
[Vol. 6
Trademarked Generic Words
famous 1838 case of Millington v. Fox,' Lord Cottenham restrained
infringement of a trademark even though the defendant had acted in
ignorance and without fraudulent intent.26  The Chancery courts
viewed adoption and use of a trademark as creating a property right
that could be protected when there was actual or probable deception
resulting in plaintiff's injury.'7 Although the exact nature of this prop-
erty right was debated,'28 it was subsequently recognized that an injunc-
tion was not granted to protect property in the word or name used as a
trademark, but rather to protect "property in the trade or good-will
which will be injured by its use."'29
B. Legal Test of Genericness
Equity's emphasis on property rights and the protection of good-
will had a profound impact on the formulation of the legal test of
genericness. In Ford v. Foster,30 a leading Chancery Appeals case de-
cided in 1872, the plaintiff had invented a peculiarly shaped shirt and
had extensively sold it as "Ford's Eureka Shirt." The defendant subse-
quently sold a similarly shaped shirt as "Foster, Porter & Co's Im-
proved Eureka." The plaintiff sought to enjoin this or any other use of
the word "Eureka," and the defendant argued that the word had
become publicijuris or "of public right."3 In establishing the test for
genericness determination, the court considered
whether the use of [the mark] by other persons is still calculated to
deceive the public, whether it may still have the effect of inducing the
public to buy goods not made by the original owner of the trade
mark as if they were his goods. If the mark has come to be so public
and in such universal use that nobody can be deceived by the use of it,
... the right to the trade mark must be gone.3'
Apart from evidence of another competitor's use of "Stroud's Eureka
Shirts" on a sign over his door, the evidence before the court on gener-
icness stemmed from the trade and shipping of defendant's shirt.33 Ap-
25. 40 Eng. Rep. 956 (Ch. 1838).
26. Id at 961.
27. KERLY, supra note 19, § 1-05.
28. Id
29. Burberrys v. J.C. Cording & Co., 1909 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 693, 701 (Ch.). Cf. I J.
GiLsoN, supra note 1, § 1.0315] (discussing trademarks as property and outlining a substan-
tially similar development in the United States).
30. [1872] 7 Ch. 611.
31. Id at 622-23.
32. Id at 628 (Mellish, LJ.) (emphasis added).
33. Id at 624-25.
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plying its test, the court enjoined the use of the term "Eureka" on shirts
manufactured by the defendant because the public was "still very liable
to be deceived."34 The court, however, did allow the defendant to con-
tinue to use the term on price lists and circulars among the wholesale
and retail trade because the shopkeepers and other dealers knew "ex-
actly what they [were] dealing in and what they [were] talking about"
and thus would not be deceived.35
The difficulty a competitor faces under this test is well-illustrated
by the 1897 House of Lords decision in Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar
Brewery Co. ,36 which upheld injunctive relief for the plaintiff. In that
case, the plaintiff sold a sauce made according to a secret recipe under
the name "Yorkshire Relish." The defendant attempted to compete by
marketing an almost identical sauce under the same name. The public
had become accustomed to asking for the article by the name "York-
shire Relish" and expected to receive goods of the plaintifi's manufac-
ture because, up to the date of the defendant's attempted market entry,
the plaintiff had been the sole manufacturer of the item. The House of
Lords rejected the defendant's argument that it had clearly identified
itself as the manufacturer and that it was merely selling a commercial
article using the only name by which it was known.37 "Yorkshire Rel-
ish," the court held, was not in such universal use that no one could be
deceived.
Since 1950, genericness defenses in the United Kingdom appar-
ently no longer need to disprove all possibility of deception. In permit-
ting limited generic use of the unregistered mark "Treasure Cot," the
Chancery Division recognized that insubstantial deception of the pub-
lic should be no barrier to declaring a mark publicijurls. Put con-
versely, "it is quite unnecessary for a Plaintiff . . . to prove that
everybody will be deceived, or even that the majority will be deceived,
so long as a substantial class of persons is likely to be involved. '38 This
reformulation of the "Eureka" test only slightly lessens the burden of
presenting a successful genericness defense.
The stringent "Eureka" test was consistently used when exclusive
rights to an "invented" or "fancy" word were in question.3 9 British and
34. Id at 629, 634.
35. Id at 626-27 (James, L.J.).
36. 1897 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 720 (H.L.).
37. Id at 727-31. ,
38. Treasure Cot Co. v. Hamley Bros., 1950 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 89, 93 (Ch.) (emphasis
added).
39. See Burberrys v. J.C. Cording & Co., 1909 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 693, 699 (Ch.).
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other Commonwealth courts, however, were" less likely to find decep-
tion when the claimed words were not invented, but rather were ex-
isting words that descriptively named a product ° For instance,
exclusive rights were denied to such unregistered words as "Malted
Milk,"4 'Post Office" directory,42 "Prophylactic" tooth brushes, 43
"Flaked Oatmeal,"'  "Hop Bitters,' 45 and "Slip-On" coats. 6 In these
cases, the question still remained one of deception, but as noted in the
"Slip-On" decision, the plaintiff's burden of establishing a probability
of deception was "greatly increased." 47 When a clear secondary mean-
ing was established in exceptional circumstances, exclusive rights were
granted, as in the "Camel Hair Belting" 48 and "Stone Ale"' cases.
40. See generally KEnLY, supra note 19, § 16-35; H. Fox, TmlE CANADIAN LAW OF
TRADEMARKS AND UNFMAR COMPETTrriON 525-26 (3d ed. 1972).
41. Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. Summerskill, 1916 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 63 (H.L)
(passing off action refused even though plaintiff sold "Malted Milk" in England on a large
scale for 26 years using a secret process so that persons asking for "malted milk" had always
received plaintiff's malted milk).
42. Kelly v. Byles, 13 Ch. D. 682 (Ch. App. 1880) (no deception and no secondary
meaning).
43. Cordes v. R. Addis & Son, 1923 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 133 (Ch.) ("prophylactic"
refers to a particular shape and make of a tooth brush).
44. Parsons Bros. v. John Gillespie & Co., 1897 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 57 (P.C.) (AustL).
45. Hop Bitters Mfg. Co. v. Luke, [1884] 10 Vict. L.R. 234 (Austl. Eq.).
46. Burberrys v. J.C. Cording & Co., 1909 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 693 (Ch.).
47. Id at 701.
48. In Reddaway v. Banham, 1896 A.C. 199, the plaintiffs had been for many years the
sole manufacturers of a belting for machinery which they had advertised and sold under the
name of "Camel Hair Belting." The defendants had commenced manufacturing belting of
the same kind and selling it as "camel hair belting." The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
defendants from using the term "camel hair" in such a manner as to deceive purchasers into
the belief that they were purchasing belting of the plaintiffs manufacture. The defendants
maintained that their belting was made substantially of camel's hair and thus were simply
making a literally true statement. The following questions were submitted to the jury.
(1) Does 'Camel Hair Belting' mean belting made by the plaintiffs, as distin-
guished from belting made by other manufacturers? Or (2) does it mean belting of
a particular kind without reference to any particular maker. (3) Do the defendants
so describe their belting as to be likely to mislead purchasers, and to lead them to
buy the defendants' belting, as and for the belting of the plaintiffs. (4) Did the
defendants endeavor to pass off their goods, as and for the goods of the plaintiffs,
so as to be likely to deceive purchasers?
The jury answered questions 1, 3, and 4 affirmatively and question 2 negatively. Based upon
the negative answer to question 2, the court enjoined the defendants from using the term.
[1895] 1 Q.B. 286, 287 (C.A.). In affirming the decision, Lord Heschell stated:
The name of a person, or words forming part of the common stock of language,
may become so far associated with the goods of a particular maker that it is capa-
ble of proof that the use of them by themselves without explanation or qualifica-
tion by another manufacturer would deceive a purchaser into the belief that he was
getting the goods of A when he was really getting the goods of B.
1896 A.C. 199, 210. The facts of the "Camel Hair Belting" case were exceptional. Appar-
1982]
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C. Patent-Expiry Rule
Intermixed with early trademark and unfair-competition law on
trademarked generic words was the so-called patent-expiry rule. This
rule was firmly established in British law by the Chancery Division in
Linoleum Manufacturing Co. v. Nairn,5° decided six years after the "Eu-
reka" case. When the plaintiff's patents expired, the defendants pro-
posed to produce and sell "Linoleum." The plaintiff argued that the
word "Linoleum" was a fancy name that was applied to his invented
substance and indicated the sole source of manufacture to the public.
In rejecting the plaintiff's action to restrain the defendants' use of the
term, Mr. Justice Fry held that the law would not require the defend-
ants to invent a new name for the article.5 This decision, following a
line of earlier cases,52 was viewed as establishing a rule that a new
name used as a trademark during the life of a patent became open to
the public upon expiration of the patent. Until others could make the
product and were at liberty to call it by the same name, the plaintiff
could not acquire an exclusive right to use that name on the ground
ently, there was a general but mistaken belief that "Camel Hair" was a fancy name that had
acquired the requisite secondary meaning. See Canadian Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg
Co. of Canada, [1938] 1 All. E.R. 618, 633 (P.C.) (Can.). In other cases plaintiffs have often
failed to establish what was established in the "Camel-Hair Belting" case. See, e.g., Cellular
Clothing Co. v. Maxton, 1899 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 397 (H.L.) (denying exclusive rights to
"Cellular" for a new weave of cloth; plaintiff failed to meet the "very great," "almost impos-
sible" burden).
49. Montgomery v. Thompson, 1891 A.C. 217. The plaintiffs and their predecessors in
this case were in the brewing business at Stone, England, Since 1780, the public had called
the ale brewed by the plaintiff "Stone Ale." The defendant built a brewery at Stone and
began to use the words "Stone Ale" in connection with his products. The defendant's use of
the term in a geographic sense was found to be deceptive, and the court enjoined him from
selling, or causing to be sold, any ale or beer not of the plaintiffs' manufacture under the
term "Stone Ale." The defendant had to describe its ale in a manner not calculated to cause
passing off. Id at 227-28.
50. 7 Ch. D. 834 (1878).
51. Justice Fry stated:
Plaintiffs . . .invented a new substance [and] gave to it the name of 'Linoleum.'
[I]t does not appear that any other name has ever been given to this substance. It
appears that the Defendants are now minded to make. . that substance. I want
to know what they are to call it. That is a question I have asked, but I have re-
ceived no answer, and for this simple reason, that no answer could be given, except
that they must invent a new name. I do not take that to be the law.
Id at 836.
52. See, e.g., Chevin v. Walker, 5 Ch. D. 850 (Ch. App. 1877) (defendant could use
"S.C.'s Patent Prize Medal Self-cleaning Rapid Water Filters" to describe the article made
according to S.C.'s expired patent); Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Shakespear, 39 LR.-Ch.
36 (1869) ("Wheeler & Wilson" open to use for describing sewing machines made according
to certain principles embodied in expired patent); Young v. Macrae, 9 Jur. (n.s.) 322 (V.C.
1862) ("Paraffin" oil generic; process patent).
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that it solely indicated the manufacture of the plaintiff and not that of
another.53 It was also thought that it should be "impossible [for] a man
to prolong his monopoly by trying to turn a description of the article
into a trade-mark."54
Later cases undercut the patent-expiry rule so that in certain cir-
cumstances the presence of deception inimical to business goodwill
would prevent a competitor's use of a term among the public. For ex-
ample, the word "Singer," held generic by the United States Supreme
Court under the American patent-expiry doctrine, s" was upheld as a
valid nongeneric trademark in British courts, based upon the notion of
deception of ordinary purchasers. 6 Further, in the notable 1902 "Vas-
eline" case, a split court of appeal distinguished the Linoleum prece-
dent.57 "Vaseline" was the name given to the invented substance under
United States rather than English patents, and the substance "was
never in England known solely [as] 'Vaseline' [which] has in England
always been confined to the inventor's manufacture."58
D. Qualified Injunctive Relief
Although the test of genericness developed under the common law
was stringent, the injunctive relief granted frequently displayed greater
flexibility. In the "Eureka" case, the injunctive relief distinguished be-
tween different classes of buyers-the public and the sophisticated
trade.59 In cases where it was possible for the defendant to use the
mark in question in a way that would not deceive the public, a quali-
fied injunction was granted to preserve the possibility of competition.
In the "Yorkshire Relish" litigation,60 it was recognized that
persons in the trade might by an honest and strong endeavour, car-
ried out effectually, so distinguish the [manufacture or] sale of the
article which they are selling from the sales of the appellant's sauce
53. Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Naim, 7 Ch. D. 834, 837 (1878). But Sf. KERLY, supra note
19, § 16-43 (suggesting that when a plaintiff has had a monopoly in fact, the difficulty of
showing the name to be distinctive is "increased").
54. Chevin v. Walker, 5 Ch. D. 850, 863 (1877). See also infra note 151 and accompa-
nying text, discussing other rationales developed under United States law.
55. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1895) ("Singer" generic for sewing
machines).
56. Singer Mfg. Co. v. British Empire Mfg. Co., 1903 1LP.D. & T.M. Cas. 313, 319
(Ch.).
57. In re Cheesebrough's Trade-Mark "Vaseline," [1902 2 Ch. 1, (Ch. App.) ("Vase-
line" also called "petroleum jelly").
58. Id at 10-11.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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• ..[so] as to prevent the possibility of the outside customer being
deceived. . . .[I]f it can be done, the trade have a right to have that
door left open to them.6
1
Injunctions under these circumstances frequently permitted use of the
mark if the defendant succeeded in "clearly," "sufficiently," or "better
distinguishing" its goods from those of the plaintiff.62 Some courts can-
didly recognized the difficulties competitors faced in achieving such re-
sults. In "Yorkshire Relish" the court noted that "if it is impossible to
comply with [the] conditions [of the qualified injunction] and yet profit-
ably compete with the plaintiff (as probably it is) the defendants must
drop the name." 63
The British courts further refined injunctive relief in generic trade-
mark litigation in the well-known "Corona" decision of 1923,64 which
dealt with the particular problems of oral transactions. In that case,
"Corona" was a word that-for the majority of the public-identified
the plaintiff's brand of cigar. The word, however, had also acquired for
many people a meaning descriptive of a particular size and shape of
cigar, irrespective of brand. The defendant, operating a well-known
restaurant in London, was frequently asked for "Corona" cigars. De-
fendant supplied cigars not of the plaintiff's manufacture and was sub-
sequently sued for passing off.65 The trial court found that a request
for a "Corona" cigar was ambiguous and issued a qualified injunction
restraining the defendant
from selling or supplying in response to any order for 'some cigars,
Coronas,' or 'Corona cigars,' or 'A Corona cigar,' or 'Coronas,' or 'a
Corona,' cigars or a cigar not of the Corona brand, unless it be first
clearly ascertained that the customer giving the order does not re-
quire cigars or a cigar of the Corona brand, and no other brand.66
On appeal, counsel for the appellant argued that it was impractical
to have waiters explain to customers the distinction between "Corona"
as an indication of a size and shape of cigar, into which all manufactur-
ers put their best tobacco, and "Corona Coronas," a brand.67 Perhaps
61. Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 54, 91-92 (Ch. App. 1895),
appeal dismissed, 1897 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 720 (H.L.).
62. See KERLY, supra note 19, §§ 16-98, at 441.
63. [1896] 2 Ch. 54, 79 (Ch. App. 1895), appeal dimissed, 1897 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 720
(H.L.).
64. Havana Cigar and Tobacco Factories Ltd. v. Oddenino, 1923 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas,
47 (C.A.).
65. Id at 54, 57.
66. Id at 58.
67. Id at 51.
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recognizing this dilemma, the court of appeal added the words "or un-
less it be made clear by word of mouth or otherwise that the cigar or
cigars supplied is or are of a brand other than the plaintiffs'."6 Despite
the additional possibilities opened up by this modification of the "Co-
rona" injunction, one would suspect that there remained a strong ten-
dency for restaurants to supply only "Corona Coronas" in response to
oral requests for "Corona" cigars. 69
The "Corona" form of injunction has also been incorporated in a
"declaration of rights' 70 when an injunction is not issued. In a defense
to a passing off action based upon the plaintiff's unregistered trademark
in the Treasure Cot case, the defendant, a retailer of toys, maintained
that the term "Treasure Cot" had become merely descriptive of a type
of cot, which, when applied to a toy cot for dolls, waspubliciftiris.71 As
in "Corona", a portion of the public used the term to mean a particular
type of cot rather than a brand name. Under these circumstances, the
court held that the plaintiffs were "entitled to have their reputation pro-
tected, but not. . . to have an absolute monopoly in these words in the
field of toys" and entered a declaration of rights in a "Corona" form"2
H. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
The enactment of trademark legislation, beginning in the late
nineteenth century, substantially modified the law of trademarks in the
Commonwealth countries. In 1875, the Trade Marks Registration Act
established the present trademark register in England 73 The British
Patents, Designs, and Trade Mark Act of 1883 permitted registration of
"fancy" words or words not in common use 4 In 1888, Parliament
substituted "invented" for "fancy" in the 1883 Act and thus permitted
68. Id at 59, 63-64.
69. Cf. id at 51 (observation by counsel for appellant that "the result will be that every
restaurant will supply... Corona Coronas").
70. In modem practice, the decision of the court is often called a declaration of rights,
particularly in Chancery cases. D. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 341 (1980).
71. Treasure Cot Co. v. Hamley Bros., 1950 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 89, 94 (Ch.).
72. Id at 93. The declaration of rights was issued rather than an injunction because
there was no threat by the defendants of continuing the acts of which the plaintiff com-
plained. Id at 94.
73. Trademarks Registration Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 91. See KERLY, supra note
19, § 1-08; H. Fox, supra note 40, at 3. The 1875 Registration Act was preceded by the
Merchandise Act of 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 38, which provided a statutory cause of action
for damages and injunctive relief in cases where a forged or counterfeit trademark had been
applied with fraudulent intent to any article for purpose of sale, manufacture, or trade. H.
Fox, supra note 40, at 2.
74. Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, 46 & 47 ViCt., ch. 57, § 64(1}(c).
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registration of "words having no reference to the character or quality of
the goods."75 The British Trade Mark Act of 1905 added a general
class of registerable marks-those which are inherently adapted to dis-
tinguish goods as evidenced by the extent to which the user has in fact
rendered said trademark "distinctive. 76 The last major revision was
the Trade Marks Act of 1938, establishing the present law of trade-
marks in the United Kingdom. 7 Similar statutory developments took
place elsewhere. In Canada, for example, a national register was estab-
lished by the Trade Mark and Design Act of 1868.78 It was amended on
several occasions and subsequently replaced by the Unfair Competition
Act of 193279 and later by the present Trade Marks Act of 1953.80
This section of the Article examines the various effects of statutory
developments on genericness issues in four areas: (1) attempted regis-
tration of generic words; (2) statutory defenses to infringement, and re-
moval of trademarks from the register on genericness grounds;
(3) special protective statutory provisions designed to prevent loss of
trademark rights by reason of the public's use of a trademark as a name
or description of an article; and (4) statutory modification of the patent-
expiry rule and enactment of a separate test of genericness for names of
chemical elements or compounds.
A. Registration of Generic Words
Section 12(l)(c) of the Canadian Trade Marks Act of 1953 prohib-
its registration of "the name in any language of any of the wares or
services in connection with which (the trademark] is used or proposed
to be used."' I The prior Unfair Competition Act also contained a simi-
lar provision.2 Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, un-
like Canada, do not have an express statutory ban on the registration of
generic words.83 In these jurisdictions, generic words have nevertheless
75. Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 50, § 10.
76. Trade Marks Act, 1905, 5 Edw. 7, ch. 15, § 9(5).
77. Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22.
78. Trade Mark and Design Act, 1868, 31 Vict., ch. 55. See H. Fox, supra note 40, at 6.
79. Unfair Competition Act, 1938, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 38.
80. Trade Marks Act, 1952-1953, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. T-10 (1970).
81. Id at § 12(l)(c). See generally H. Fox, .wpra note 40, at 140-41.
82. Unfair Competition Act, 1938, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 38, § 26(1)(e).
83. Similarly, no direct prohibition on the registration of generic words exists under
federal trademark legislation in the United States. See I J. MCCARTHY, spra note 7,
§ 12:18, at 441. Section (2)e of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1976), which prohibits
registration of "merely descriptive" words, however, has been interpreted to prohibit regis-
tration of generic terms on the ground that they are incapable of distinguishing the appli-
cant's goods from those of others. 1 J. MCCARTHY, upra note 7, § 12:18, at 441.
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been refused registration on the ground that they are not within the
statutory criteria for registration. For example, under the British
Trademark Registration Act of 1875, the court of appeal refused to per-
mit an attempted registration claim for exclusive use of the words
"Carbolic acid" in the mark "Carbolic acid soap powder." These
words could not be considered as distinguishing the brand of a particu-
lar person." Similarly, registration under the British Trade Marks Act
of 1883 was refused to "Gem" air guns because it indicated a type of
gun to the public, without reference to a particular manufacturer and
thus was not a "fancy" word. 5 Under the 1905 British Act, registration
of "Diamine" for dyes was refused on the ground that it was based
upon a known chemical term indicating a certain composition, and
thus it had an impermissible "direct reference to the character" of the
goods.8 6 In 1910, a Chancery Division decision rejected the registra-
tion application for "Gramophone" based upon evidence making it
clear that "to the general public the word. . . now denotes a talking
machine. . . a particular type of talking machine, and denotes this
without any connotation of the source of manufacture. 87 Under the
current British Act, words used as the names of products such as
"Portogram" and "Synotophore" have been refused registration in op-
position proceedings because they lacked distinctiveness.88
In general, there appear to be relatively few recently litigated cases
dealing with refusals to register generic words in the jurisdictions stud-
ied.89 It may be that the various registrars and courts have been able to
prevent the exclusive appropriation of words in the public domain by
registration.9" One cannot be certain, however, that registration of ge-
84. In re Hudson's Trade Marks, 1886 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 155, 162 (C.A.).
85. In re Arbenz' Application, [1887] 35 Ch. 248, 265 (Ch. App.).
86. In re Leopold Cassella & Co.'s Application, 1910 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 453, 460
(C.A.). See also Application of E. M. Bowden's Patents Syndicate Ltd., 1909 R.P.D. & T.M.
Cas. 205 (Ch.) (name of patented article refused registration for lack of distinctiveness).
87. In re Gramophone Co.'s Application, [1910] 2 CIL 423, 431.
88. Portogram Radio Elec. Co.'s Application, 1952 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 241 (Hearing
Officer) ("Portogram" held to be the name of a combined portable gramophone and record
player); Elliot Optical Co.'s Application, 1952 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 169 (Ass't Comptroller)
("Synotophore" held to be the name of a type of optical instrument). f In re . Demuth
Ltd.'s Application, 1948 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 342 (Hearing Officer) (registration of "Seda
Seltzer" allowed despite objection from the holder of the "Alka-Seltzee" mark; "seltzer"
common to the trade and a generic description).
89. See generally K.Y, supra note 19, § 8-48, at 125-27.
90. Perhaps a factor in the apparent lack of litigation concerning refusals to register
allegedly generic words is the provision of informal advice by the Registrar. Section 42 of
the 1938 British Act empowers the Registrar to state whether the mark is prima fade distinc-
tive. See Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 42; KERLY, supra note 19, § 8-02.
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neric words in these countries is not taking place, as some proceedings
suggest that common names may occasionally be registered. 9
B. Statutory Defenses to Infringement and Removal of Trademarks
from the Register
The trademark acts have in various ways made possible defenses
based upon genericness when an alleged infringer has been sued by the
owner of a registered mark. The British Trade Marks Act of 1938 pro-
vides a defense for the "use by any person of any bona fide description
of the character or quality of his goods."' 92 This defense is qualified so
as to forbid such use in a manner that suggests a person has the right to
use the plaintiff's trademark.93 New Zealand's statute tracks this lan-
guage.94 In Australia, there is a defense to infringement for "use in
good faith by a person of a description of the character or quality of his
goods. 95 This defense apparently subsumes genericness. A Western
Australia Supreme Court decision in 1967 concerning the registered
word "Laundromat" allowed a "generic theme" defense which, in that
case, was rejected due to insufficient evidence.96 Finally, in Canada,
alleged infringers may argue that they are making a bona fide use of an
"accurate description of the character or quality of. . . wares or serv-
91. See, e.g., Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg Co. of Gr. Brit., 1939 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas.
137 (H.L.) ("Shredded Wheat" generic at time of registration); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Thermopart Pty. Ltd., 1968 W. Austl. R. 39 (1967) ("Laundromat" infringed). Cf "Daiquiri
Rum" Trade Mark, 1969 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 600 (H.L.) ("Daiquiri Rum" wrongly entered
on Register).
92. Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 8(b).
93. Id Cf. A.V. Roe & Co. v. Aircraft Disposal Co., 1920 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas, 249 (Ch.)
(decided under earlier trademark act). In .4. V Roe, the plaintiff manufactured airplanes
which it marketed under its registered trademark, "Avro." During World War 1, airplanes
using the plaintiff's design had been manufactured for the government by other manufactur-
ers. The defendants had acquired several of these airplanes from the Aircraft Disposal
Board of the Ministry of Munitions. The plaintiff sought to restrain the defendants from
selling these aircraft as "Avro" airplanes. The court enjoined the defendants from selling, or
offering for sale, as "Avro" goods, airplanes not being of the plaintiff's manufacture, but
permitted the defendants to sell aircraft made according to the plaintiff's design as "Avro
type" or "type Avro" airplanes. Id at 250-51.
94. New Zealand Trade Marks Act, 1953, § 12(b), OFFNER'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE-
MARK SERVICE 1630, 1634 (2d ed. 1981).
95. Australian Trade Marks Act, 1955-1958, § 64(b), OFFNER'S INTERNATIONAL
TRADEMARK SERVICE 1047, 1060 (2d ed. 1981).
96. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Thermopart Pty. Ltd., 1968 W. Austl. L.R. 39,44-47 (S.
Ct. 1967) (permitting a "generic theme" to be developed in evidence and argument, but
holding that although some people in Australia used the word "Laundromat" in a general
sense, it had not achieved a generic meaning). See also James A. Jobling & Co. v. James
McEwan & Co., 1933 Austl. L.R. 183 (Vict.) ("Pyrex" and "Pyrexware" was a "bonafide
description of the character [of the goods]" under an earlier Australian trademark act).
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ices. . . in such a manner as is not likely to have the effect of depreci-
ating the value of the goodwiU attaching to the trade mark."97 This
defense may include genericness, as the Canadian "Yo-Yo" case
implies.98
In addition to these defenses, various statutory procedures exist for
the removal of trademark registrations.99 Based upon these procedures,
some registrations of generic words have been expunged. For example,
in an 1894 appeal from the Chief Judge in Equity of the Supreme
Court of New South Wales, Australia, the Privy Council reviewed the
right to register "Maizena" in Australia as a mark for starch or flour
made from maize. "Maizena" was ordered expunged from the register
because it had become at the time of registrationpublicijurs. Though
invented and once distinctive, and probably still distinctive in other ar-
eas of the word, "Maizena" was not a valid registration in New South
Wales.1°°
In the 1910 litigation in which "Gramophone" was refused regis-
tration on the ground of lack of distinctiveness, the Chancery Division
indicated that the time at which the issue of distinctiveness was to be
measured for purposes of removal under the British Act was the time at
which registration took place, not at the time of the petition for re-
97. Trade Marks Act, 1952-1953, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. T-10, § 20 (1970).
98. Cheerio Toys & Games, Ltd. v. Dubiner, 1966 S.C.L 206, 219-21 (defendants at-
tempted to raise genericness of the registered mark, "Yo-Yo," but were estopped from dis-
puting its validity because the defendant had previously assigned the mark to the plaintiff).
99. See, eg., British Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 32 (rectification of
register); Trade Marks Act, 1952-1953 CAN. Rlv. STAT. ch. T-10, § 43 (1970) (amendment
of register). It should be noted that the early British trademark acts, however, did not pro-
vide for removal. The lack of such a provision created certain inconsistencies, as noted in
the Gramophone decision. In re Gramophone Co.'s Application, [1910] 2 Ch. 423, 436 ("It
... was in effect asked at the trial, why such words as, for example, 'Pianola' or 'Vaseline'
should be on the Register... if 'Gramophone' were refused registration").
100. National Starch Mfg. Co. v. Munn's Patent Maizena & Starch Co., 1894 A.C. 275
(P.C.) (AustL). See also Wolfe v. Alsop, [1886] 12 Vict. L.R. 887 (Vic. Sup. CL P.C.) (AustL)
("Schnapps"publicijuris); S.M.T. Gramophone Co. v. Itonia Gramophone Co., 1931 R.P.D.
& T.M. 309 (Ch.) ("Consolette" gramophone removed from register); James A. Jobling &
Co. v. James McEwan & Co., [1933] Austl L.R. 183 (Vic.) ('Pyrex" expunged from Austra-
lian register); Waterman v. Ayres, [1888] 39 Ch. 29 (Ch. App.) ("Reversi," registered under
the 1883 British Patents, Designs & Trade Marks Act, removed from register). In this case,
Lord Justice Fry stated.
The plaintiff... invented this new game, to which he gave the name 'Reversi.' He
had a very large sale for this game, and the consequence was that the word
'Reversi' had amongst persons conversant with games come to describe this partic-
ular game. Now that which is the only name of a thing cannot, it seems to me, be a
fancy word with regard to it.
Id at 38.
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moval.' 0 1 In other words, a registered mark which subsequenily became
nondistinctive could not be removed from the register. The Supreme
Court of Canada, following the dictum of Gramophone, held "Aspirin"
to be a valid trademark in 1924 despite evidence that it had become a
widely used generic word since registration. 12 This decision is at odds
with Learned Hand's famous 1921 opinion rendering aspirin a generic
word capable of being used by all competitors in their sales to the pub-
lic in the United States.' 0 3 To this day, "Aspirin" is still a valid trade-
mark in Canada, with competitors forced to sell their brand of
,,a.s.a.,,104
The dictum of Gramophone was confirmed by the House of Lords
in the 1939 British Shredded Wheat decision. 05 According to leading
commentators, it appears settled under British law that once a mark
has been validly registered, it "does not cease to be validly registered
merely because at some later date distinctiveness is lost. .. .106 This
same rule applies to a mark "whose original registration is by virtue of
section 13 . . .no longer open to question [even if] at some later date
distinctiveness. . . is found never to have existed." 0 7 Section 13 of the
1938 Act creates a conclusive presumption of validity of the original
registration after a mark has been registered for seven years. 0 8
Canada, however, has legislatively reversed the doctrine that an
initially distinctive registered mark could not be removed from the reg-
101. In re Gramophone Co.'s Application, [1910] 2 Ch. 423, 436-37 (dictum).
102. Bayer Co. v. American Druggists' Syndicate, Ltd., 1924 S.C.R. 558. Cf. General
Motors Corp. v. Bellows, 1949 S.C.R. 678 ("Frigidaire" expunged on the ground that it was
a nondistinctive, uninvented word at time of registration).
103. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). The British Board
of Trade cancelled the registration of "Aspirin" under special wartime legislation provisions
in 1915. See Bayer Co. v. American Druggists Syndicate, Ltd., 1924 S.C.R. 558, 567.
104. Telephone interview with Professor Jack Roberts, University of Western Ontario
(April 15, 1982). "A.s.a." refers to the chemical composition of aspirin, acetylsalicylic acid,
"Aspirin" is stiR a valid trademark in several countries. 51 TRADE-MARK REP. 53 (1961).
105. Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg Co. of Gr. Brit., 1939 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 137, 147-
48 (H.L.). Accord Elliot Optical Co.'s Application, 1952 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 169, 172 (Ass't
Comptroller).
106. KERLY, supra note 19, § 11-12.
107. Id
108. British Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 13 (referring to Part A of the
British Register). But ef South African Trade Marks Act, 1963, §§ 41(1), 42(b), OFFNaR'S
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK SERVICE 1968, 1708 (2d ed. 1981) (no conclusive presumption
of validity if the trademark "consists of a word which has become generally recognized by
the public as the only practicable name or description for any article or substance for which
it is registered and has commonly been so used by persons conducting business in relation
to" articles or substances other than those of the registered owner).
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ister on the ground that it had subsequently become nondistinctive. 10
The Canadian Act expressly provides that registrations are invalid if
"the trademark is not distinctive at the time proceedings bringing the
validity of the registration into question are commenced.""10 In 1969,
the Exchequer Court of Canada substantially undermined this legisla-
tive position by its decision in Aladdin Industries v. Canadian Thermos
Products, Ltd I I Aladdin Industries, following its victory in United
States courts which resulted in non-exclusive rights to "Thermos,""12
petitioned to expunge "Thermos" from the Canadian register. Re-
jecting expert-opinion evidence on genericness, skeptically admitting.
evidence from dictionaries and reference books, and noting its inability
to fashion complex equitable relief, the Exchequer Court ruled against
Aladdin. The court did so despite its own finding that "thermos" and
"thermos bottle" "were used and understood by persons of average ed-
ucation and intelligence in ordinary society as generic words.. . sy-
nonymous with 'vacuum bottle' in English and 'bouteille isolante' in
French.""1 3 The court also found that an "appreciable portion" of the
population in Canada knew and recognized the distinctive significance
of respondent's mark "Thermos." No definite percentages, said the
court, could be ascertained for that portion, but their numbers were
"many not a few."' 14 The court then purported to evaluate consumer
and competitive risks associated with expungement of "Thermos." '" s
In short, the court favored a minor deception harmful to business good-
will over a great potential for consumer confusion and harm stemming
from Aladdin's competitive disadvantage. Thus, the result was similar
to that which would have traditionally prevailed under "Eureka,"
which permitted exclusive rights to continue unless the trademark had
become so public and universal that no one could be deceived by a
competitor's use of the mark. 6
109. Trade Marks Act, 1952-1953, CAN. Rav. STAT. ch. T-10, § 18(l)(b) (1970). Austra-
lia also appears to have legislatively reached the same result. See Australian Trade Marks
Act, 1955-1958, §§ 60, 61(1)(c), OFFNER'S INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK SERvica 1047, 1059
(2d ed. 1981). See also F.H. Faulding & Co. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 112 C.L.R. 537
(AustL 1965) ("Barrier Cream").
110. Trade Marks Act, 1952, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. T-10, § 18(1)(b) (1970). See H. Fox,
supra note 40, at 316.
111. [196912 Can. Exch. 80.
112. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
113. [1969] 2 Can. Exch. at 113.
114. Id at 114-16.
115. Id at 119-21.
116. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
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C. Protective Statutory Provisions
Many of the changes included in the British Trade Marks Act of
1938 followed recommendations in the Report of the Departmental
Committee on Trademarks presented to Parliament in 1934.1'7 The
Report reflected the view, according to leading commentators, that
trademark owners should be given "a more effective monopoly and
wider facilities in acquiring and dealing with [trademarks]."I"8 One of
the recommended changes, incorporated into section 15, provides that
trademark registrations do not become invalid "by reason only" of any
"use," after registration of the trademarked words, as the "name or
description of an article or substance." If such use, however, becomes
"well known and established" among "trade" persons in connection
with goods other than those of the trademark holder, then a mark con-
sisting solely of that word or those words is deemed to be wrongly re-
maining on the register and thus subject to removal.' 9  Such a mark
117. REPORT OF THE DEP'T COMMITTEE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO
TRADE MARKS (1934) [hereinafter cited as the GOSCHEN REPORT].
118. KERLY, supra note 19, § 1-12. By providing a means for removal of trademarks
generic to the trade from the register, these provisions have ironically expanded the risks
associated with loss of exclusive trademark rights under British law. This irony results from
the House of Lords decision in Shredded Wheat, infra note 143 and accompanying text,
which held one year after the enactment of those provisions that for purposes of proceedings
to remove trademarks, distinctiveness could only be judged at the time of registration. Thus,
but for these protective provisions, marks becoming generic after registration could never be
removed from the register.
119. 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 15. See generally W. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 549-51 (1981). The Committee
had recommended:
We think that the evidence shows clearly the need for some protection for an ad-
vertised trade-mark which as a result of such advertisement has been adopted by
the public as a descriptive name of the article to an extent beyond the power of the
trade-mark proprietor to control. This tendency on the part of the public is no
doubt due largely to the fundamental changes that have taken place in recent years
in the function and use of trade-marks. Under modem conditions it is customary
to build up the business around the trade-mark by advertisement, and it is beyond
the control of the trader to prevent the public from identifying and ordering goods
by reference to the mark and from using the mark as the name of the article. The
common law rule appears therefore to be based upon obsolete conditions, and to
be a source of embarrassment to traders, and we suggest that provision should be
made by legislation for overcoming these difficulties by reversing the existing rule,
but subject to the conditions which we specify. We do not believe that such an
alteration in the law will operate to confer on the proprietor of the mark any mo-
nopoly in the sale of the goods to which he has applied it. It may give him an
initial advantage over his competitors, but not more, we think, than is due him in
respect of his being first in the field and of his expenditure in research, develop-
ment and advertising.
We accordingly recommend that a provision be inserted in Section 6 to the
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also containing "other matters" may remain on the register subject to
the entry of a disclaimer of exclusive use of the mark.1 20 For purposes
of any other legal proceedings relating to the trademark, "all rights of
the proprietor, whether under the common law or by registration" to
exclusive use are deemed to have ceased on the date the "trade" use
"first became well known and established."1 21 This loss of rights re-
lates not only to the article or substance concerned, but also to any
goods "of the same description."' 22 The protective language of section
15 is wholly reproduced in New Zealand's Act and very substantially in
the Australian Act."2 It is not found in the Canadian Act.
Surprisingly, only one significant case has been litigated under sec-
tion 15. In the 1969 "Daiquiri Rum" Trade Mark case, t24 rectification
of the trademark "Daiquiri Rum" was sought on the ground that there
was a well-known and established use of the mark among the trade as
the name of an article or substance: a cocktail, made of rum, known as
a Daiquiri. The trademark holder argued that "an article or sub-
stance" meant an article or substance within the scope of the registra-
tion and that because the mark was registered for rum only, rum
effect that the rights, whether under common law or by Statute, of the proprietor of
a registered word trade-mark should not be prejudiced by the fact that that word is
or has become used as the name or description of an article or substance, unless it
is proved that there has been and is a well-known and established use of such word
in the course of trade by some person other than the proprietor of the trade-mark
or a registered user, to describe in trade the particular article or substance, not
being goods having any connection in the course of trade with the proprietor of the
trade-mark or a registered user. In the last mentioned case, either such word should
no longer be deemed to be a distinctive mark and should be removable by the
Court or the Registrar from the Register on the application of any person ag-
grieved, or the Court or the Registrar should be empowered to give such other
relief as may be suitable in the circumstances.
GOSCHEN REPORT, supra note 117, at 80, reprinted in Derenberg, "Shredded Mheat'- The
Still-Born Trade-mark, 16 N.Y.U. L. REv. 376, 395-96 (1939).
120. 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 15(2)(b).
121. Id § 15(2)(c).
122. Id § 15(2)(a), (b).
123. New Zealand Trade Marks Act, 1953, § 24, OFFNER's INTERNATIONAL TRADE-
MARK SERVICE 1630, 1637-38 (2d ed. 1981). Australian Trade Marks Act, 1955-1958, § 56,
OFFNER'S INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK SERVICE 1047, 1058-59 (2d ed. 1981). Since Aus-
tralia appears to have reversed the British rule that distinctiveness for purposes of removal
of trademarks from the register is to be judged at the time of registration and not at the time
of the proceedings to remove the mark, supra note 109, the effect of these provisions in
Australia is truly protective. But for these provisions, Australia's law would likely follow
that of Canada, allowing genericness challenges at any time on grounds to be determined no
doubt with reference to the common law.
124. "Daiquiri Rum" Trade Mark, 1969 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 600 (H.L.).
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cocktails fell outside the scope of the registration. t25 Reversing the
court of appeal, the House of Lords ruled that a well-known and estab-
lished use by the trade in relation to "goods of the same description"
was sufficient to invalidate the registration under section 15.126
The effect of section 15 is to afford "[w]ord marks which are
adopted by the public as the name of the goods, if registered,. . . more
favorable treatment. . . than was the case before the Act," '127 with the
result that such marks "may have great commercial value.12 Thus,
these sections encourage a trademark holder to register a mark and
thereafter encourage the public to adopt it as the name of the article,
while at the same time vigorously pursuing a program to ensure that
"the trade [does] not adopt a similar practice."' 129 Two tests of generic-
ness have therefore been created. Unregistered marks or registered
marks forming the basis for common-law actions are judged under the
demanding deception test of "Eureka." Registered marks, when in-
fringement relief is sought, are protected by statutory provisions that
are purposefully more demanding than "Eureka."' 130
125. Id at 608.
126. Id at 609. See also Wheatcroft Bros. Trade Marks, 71 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 43 (Ch.
1953) (registrations for rose varieties removed from British register) (pleaded under section
15, but not decided under that section).
127. KERLY, supra note 19, § 1-14. Cf. In re Gramophone Co.'s Application, [1910] 2
Ch. 423, 436 ("To induce the public to adopt a catching word as the name of the article to
which it is applied, especially if the article be comparatively new, it is only necessary to
advertise the article on a sufficiently large scale under that name. . . . Such a procedure
would, or might, have been fatal to any remedy based upon common law rights, but does not
affect the value of a registered mark the distinctiveness of which is assumed and need never
be proved").
128. KERLY, supra note 19, § 11-21. Cf. In re Gramophone Co.'s Application, [1910] 2
Ch. 423, 436 ("It may, therefore, be in the interests of the registered [owner] that the word
should lose its distinctiveness so far as the public [is] concerned [thereby obtaining] a practi-
cal and perpetual monopoly in the article itself'); Burberrys v. J.C. Cording & Co., 1909
R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 693, 708 (Ch.) (with the example of "Vaseline" before them, "it is not
unlikely that the ingenuity of manufacturers or traders should be devoted to devising a simi-
lar mode of procedure in the case of their own goods, for a monopoly thus obtained may be
more valuable than any Patent").
129. KERLY, supra note 19, § 11-21. In contrast, the South African trademark law specif-
ically discourages this course of action by providing for removal of a mark from South
African register if the trademarked word becomes generally recognized by the public as the
only practical name or description and has been so used by the trade. South African Trade
Mark Act, 1963, § 41(1), OFFNER'S INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK SERvIcE 1698, 1708 (2d
ed. 1981).
130. See KERLY, stupra note 19, § 1-14. Kerly suggests that the more favorable treatment
of words adopted by the public as the name of the goods under § 15 may have the effect of
modifying the common-law rules in this regard. Id.
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D. Statutory Modification of the Patent-Expiry Rule and the
Special Statutory Test for Names of Chemical Elements
or Compounds
The British Trade Marks Act of 1905 was amended in 1919 to give
statutory effect to the patent-expiry rule of. the "Linoleum" case.
Under section 6(1), all exclusive rights, both under the Act and at com-
mon law, ceased if the trademark was "the name or [the] only practica-
ble name of [an] article or substance" manufactured under a patent
upon its expiration.131 Section 15 of the 1938 Act modifies this rule by
providing that the owner of such a mark loses exclusive rights only if it
remains "the only practicable name or description of the article or sub-
stance" after a period of two years following the cesser of the patent. 32
Similar provisions are included in the Australian and New Zealand,
but not the Canadian, trademark acts. 33
Apparently, the practical effect of the 1938 change is to force com-
petitors to adopt or invent some alternative name if they begin to man-
ufacture and market the formerly patented goods during the first two
years after the patent's expiration.'3 It has thus been suggested that
the result of this modification may be that "the prospect of the patentee
preserving his trademark is much increased."' 35 It is ironic that the
patent-expiry rule, which at common law was a powerful force in deter-
minations of genericness, as codified, serves to insulate trademark
holders from loss of exclusive rights. The authors have been unable to
find any example of a loss of trademark rights under the statutory mod-
ifications of the patent-expiry rule.
Section 6(2) of the 1919 British Act restricted the registration-and
provided for removal-of a word that was "the only practicable name
or description of any single chemical element or single chemical com-
pound, as distinguished from a mixture."' 36 Section 15(3) of the 1938
British Act carries this provision forward, but substitutes "commonly
used and accepted name" for the phrase "the only practicable
131. 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 79, § 6(1) (1919). See KERLY, supra note 19, § 11-22. This sec-
tion also provided for removal of such marks from the British register.
132. 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 15(l)(b).
133. See New Zealand Trade Marks Act, 1953, § 24(1)(b), OFFNER'S IcTERNATIONAL
TRADEMARK SERVICE 1630, 1637 (2d ed. 1981); Australian Trade Marks Act, 1955-1958,
§ 56(2)(b), OFFN'S INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK SERVICE 1047, 1058 (2d ed. 1981); H.
Fox, supra note 40, at 292.
134. See KERLY, supra note 19, § 11-22; Derenberg, supra note 119, at 395 n.57. Cf
supra note 51.
135. KERLY, supra note 19, § 11-22.
136. 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 79, § 6(2).
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name."' 37 This provision does not affect words that "denote only a
brand or make" of the element or compound of the trademark holder
when they are used "in association with a suitable name or description
open to the public use."' 38 Similar provisions are included in New
Zealand's trademark law, but not that of Canada or Australia t39
Again, the authors have been unable to locate any example of a loss of
trademark rights under these special provisions.140
III. CONTRASTING DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES
In the preceding sections, we have traced the common-law and
statutory development of the law of trademarked generic words in Brit-
ain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In this section, we briefly
examine the sharply contrasting approach of the law in the United
States.
A. "Primary Significance" Test in the United States
In 1938, the Privy Council, on appeal from the Court of Appeal
for Ontario, Canada, upheld a genericness defense to an infringement
and unfair-competition suit concerning the "Shredded Wheat" trade-
mark.'4 1 The Privy Council's decision was influenced by the patent-
expiry rule and generic use of the mark by its holder. From the outset
of the opinion, the assumption was that "Shredded Wheat" was the
name of the product; nonetheless, it was apparent that the Privy Coun-
cil thought that if the Canadian Shredded Wheat Co. could have ade-
quately shown distinctiveness, exclusive rights would have been
enforced. 142 The House of Lords Shredded Wheat decision, uphold-
ing defendant's petition to remove the mark from the British register
for lack of distinctiveness at the time of registration, substantially re-
137. 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 15(3).
138. Id
139. New Zealand Trade Marks Act, 1953, § 24(3), OFFNER'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE-
MARK SERVICE 1630, 1638 (2d ed. 1981). See also supra note 129 (South African trademark
law).
140. Cf. "Manganin" Trade Mark, 1967 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 271 (Board of Trade 1966)
("Manganin" alloy); "Terramycin" Trade Mark, 1966 F.S.R. 339 (Hearing Officer) (failure
of proof in rectification and opposition proceedings; under the provisions of section 15(3),
"Terramycin" not shown to have become the commonly used and accepted name for a par-
ticular type of antibiotic).
141. Canadian Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg Co. of Canada, [1938] 1 All E.R. 618
(P.C.) (can.).
142. Id at 627, 631-33. See Derenberg, supra note 119, at 404-05.
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produces the opinion of the Privy Council. 43
At the same time, rights to the unregistered "Shredded Wheat"
mark were also being litigated in the United States.'" The United
States Supreme Court decision in that case marked a turning point in
American law on genericness. In upholding Kellogg's genericness de-
fense, Justice Brandeis' reasoning mixed the patent-expiry and unfair-
competition doctrines. 45 In the course of the opinion, however, Justice
Brandeis stated the current test of genericness in the United States,
which focuses on the consuming public's understanding of the "princi-
pal" or "primary significance" of trademarked words.'46 Thus, if a ma-
jority of the relevant consuming public regarded a word as
denominating a product category rather than its source, the word
would principally be a generic term, and exclusive rights to its use
would be lost. 47 This test has since been utilized in a wealth of United
States infringement and declaratory judgment decisions determining
genericness. 141
B. The Patent-Expiry Rule in the United States
The English patent-expiry rule of the Linoleum case 149 was ap-
143. See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg Co. of Gr. Brit., 1939 P-P.D. & T.M. Cas. 137
(H.L.).
144. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
145. Id at 116-20. See generaly Derenberg, supra note 119, at 378-80.
146. 305 U.S. at 118. See Folsom & Teply, rupra note 2, at 1327-28.
147. McCarthy explains the operation of this test in the following manner
[When] some customers regard [a] term as generic, while others regard it as a
[source-significant] mark, the term must be placed either in the 'generic' pigeon-
hole or in the 'trademark' category. For example, if a survey showed that 75 per
cent of the people regarded the word as generic, then that is its 'principal signifi-
cance.' Even if the seller educates a few customers to use the generic term as a
mark, it is still principally generic. . . . If, on the other hand, 75% of the public
regarded the term as a trademark for certain goods, then that term would be princi-
pally a trademark. Consumer survey evidence is admissible to show how prospec-
tive purchasers regard the term at issue.
1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 12:2, at 408 (footnotes omitted).
148. Not all courts in the United States have followed the "primary significance" test. In
Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, 270 (D. Mass. 1955), a f'd, 237 F.2d 428 (1st Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957), the Court held that the mark must have lost all of
its trademark significance to the consuming public as a whole before it will be considered
generic. On this basis, the court held that use of the "Polaroid" mark had not "come to be so
public and in such universal use that nobody [could] be deceived by the use of it," despite its
finding that "one would have to be blind to deny that there has been a widespread generic
use of the word 'polaroid."' Id The test in Polaroid is identical with that used under the
British common law, spra notes 30-38 and accompanying text, and in modem United
States trademark law represents an aberration.
149. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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plied in a number of decisions in the United States, including the
United States Supreme Court's Singer decision of 1895.150 These deci-
sions rationalized the expiry rule in terms of either a legal presumption
of genericness once the underlying patent expired or an implied agree-
ment or consent by the patentee to dedicate the mark to the public
upon expiration. 151  Later American cases and commentators-espe-
cially after the "primary significance" test fully emerged-have re-
jected the rule. 52  Genericness is instead a question of fact to be
resolved by the same principles applicable to trademarked words ap-
pearing on nonpatented products, without the operation of a presump-
tion against the patentee. 53
C. Federal Trademark Legislation
No specific prohibition against the registration of generic words,
such as that found in the Canadian Act,' 54 exists in the Lanham Trade-
mark Act of 1946, the current United States trademark law.' 55 The
Lanham Act has, however, been interpreted to deny registration to ge-
neric words, even if distinctiveness or secondary meaning could be
proved.'56 The Lanham Act does specifically provide for cancellation
of a mark if at any time it "becomes the common descriptive name of
150. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 194 (1895). See also Warren Feath-
erbone Co. v. American Featherbone Co., 141 F. 513, 516-17 (7th Cir, 1905); Centaur Co, v.
Heinsfurter, 84 F. 955, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1898). The courts even developed a "copyright-
expiry rule." See, e.g., Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Co., 237 U.S. 618 (1915).
151. See, e.g., 163 U.S. at 199 (consent theory); Yale Towne Mfg. Co. v. Ford, 203 F. 707,
709 (3d Cir. 1913) (implied agreement); Frank W. Whitcher Co. v. Sneierson, 205 F. 767,
769 (D. Mass. 1913) (legal presumption).
152. See, e.g., 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 12-17, at 439-40; 1 J. GILSON, sIpra note
1, § 2.02[3], at 2-21.
153. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 735 comment b (1938); Handler & Picknett, Trade-
Marks and Trade Names-4n 4naysis and Synthesis, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 187 (1930).
Cf. Lysol (Can.) Ltd. v. Solidol Chem. Ltd., 1933 Can. Exch. 21 (1932) (upon patent expiry,
whether or not the name of a patented article is descriptive of the article itself is a question
of fact under Canadian law).
154. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
155. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976). The United States
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the first federal law providing for national regis.
tration of trademarks nine years after it was enacted. The basis of the Court's decision was
that Congress had not limited the enactment to interstate or foreign commerce. Tradc-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). In 1881, a new statute was passed providing for the registration of
trademarks used in commerce with Indian tribes and foreign commerce. Registration of
fanciful and arbitrary trademarks used in interstate commerce was permitted under a 1905
act. It was supplemented in 1920 and then replaced by the 1946 Lanham Act. See generally
1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 5.4.
156. See Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1327 n.29.
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an article or substance, patented or otherwise."'' 57 The "primary signif-
icance" test has often been used in cancellation proceedings under the
Lanham Act. 5 Nothing in the Lanham Act parallels the protective
provisions that bar evidence of public use in genericness litigation
under the British, New Zealand, and Australian Acts, 5 9 nor are there
any provisions which codify the patent-expiry rule or specifically treat
chemical elements or compounds.'60
The Lanham Act further provides that no incontestable exclusive
rights can be obtained for trademarked words which are "the common
descriptive name of any article or substance, patented or otherwise."' 6
This latter provision ensures that genericness defenses can be raised in
infringement or declaratory judgment proceedings. 62
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This section comparatively evaluates the developments in Com-
monwealth and United States law affecting trademarked generic words.
This evaluation will examine several issues evident from the contrast-
ing legal approaches described above: Does the "Eureka" test of gener-
icness-deception of the public-encourage transactional efficiency?
Does a "property rights" approach to trademarks adequately serve the
public interest? Should trademarks that become generic be protected
from deregistration? Should understanding or usage by the trade or
the public be determinative of trademark rights? How should the exist-
ence of patent rights affect rights to a trademark used in connection
with the patented product? Should chemical elements or compounds
be treated specially under the law? What is the utility of remedial ap-
proaches like the "Corona" injunction? Our stated position is that eco-
nomic considerations ought to be given decisive weight in answering
157. Lanham Trademark Act, § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976).
158. See 3 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETION, TRADEMARKS AND MO-
NOPOLIES § 74 (3d ed. 1967).
159. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
161. Lanham Trademark Act, § 15(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4) (1976).
162. See Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1331. The Lanham Act further provides that
it shall be a defense to trademark infringement, even when incontestable rights have been
obtained, if the alleged infringing use was "otherwise than as a trade or service mark.., of
a term.. which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users
the goods or services of such party." 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (1976). See Kaul, Firstmend-
ment Considerations, in PRAcTIsING LAW INST., COURSE HANDBOOK No. 141, GENERIC
TRADEMARKS 53, 66-67 (1981).
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questions such as these.163
A. An Evaluation of the Property Rights Approach to Genericness
Issues and the Deception Rationale
The historical basis for the intervention of courts of equity in
trademark cases has been to protect property rights. Early in this litiga-
tion, it was recognized that "there is no such thing as a monopoly or a
property in the nature of a copyright, or. .. a patent, in the use of any
name."' 164 But equity courts recognized a property interest in the good-
will associated with marks used by manufacturers to identify their
goods. On this basis, courts refused to allow competitors to appropriate
that goodwill by deceiving the purchasing public by use of those
marks. 65 This protection of "intellectual property," as it is called, is
perfectly sound in the case of properly functioning trademarks. Our
sense of fairness and protection of the public dovetails to produce a
rational economic result: distributional efficiencies are enhanced, a
constant level of quality is promoted, search costs are reduced, and ad-
vertising is facilitated. 66
It is evident that the deception test for genericness determinations
established by "Eureka" results from the court's view that a trademark
holder owns property which must be protected by the courts. The strict
"Eureka" test-"whether the mark has come to be so public and in
such universal use that nobody can be deceived"-was applied to "in-
vented" or "fancy" words created by the trademark owner. 67 In many
instances, the trademark holder had promoted the mark, at great ex-
pense, as the name of a type of product and as a source-significant
word. In "Eureka" for instance, over 7000 pounds sterling had been
spent on advertising. 68
The Commonwealth courts were less exacting, and properly so, in
their approach to existing descriptive words, by requiring a clear show-
ing of "secondary meaning" and a high probability of deception before
exclusive trademark rights would be upheld.' 69 In this regard, it is
noteworthy that United States courts have often failed to adequately
163. See Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1352-54 (proposing a transactional efficiency
test).
164. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog, 18 Ch. D. 395, 412 (Ch. App. 1879).
.165. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
168. Ford v. Foster, [1872] 7 Ch. 611, 614 (Ch. App.).
169. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
[Vol, 6
Trademarked Generic Words
distinguish generic marks (product names) from descriptive marks
(describing product attributes).17 Though overlap will be inevitable
when descriptive trademarked words have also become product names,
such as "Shredded Wheat," differentiating between these types of
marks helps to clarify the law and the relevant economic issues.1t
Nevertheless, the property rights orientation of the common law ex-
plains the willingness of the Privy Council and the House of Lords to
consider permitting exclusive rights to such words if adequate showings
of distinctiveness and potential deception were made.17 2
When a trademark begins to perform a generic function, a tension,
as noted at the outset of this Article, is created.' 73 This tension is be-
tween the public's interest in promoting competition and removing in-
formation barriers that enhance search costs on one hand and the
protection of business goodwill on the other. In such circumstances, an
overemphasis on property concepts may lead the court to ask the wrong
questions. In a prior article critiquing, from an economic perspective,
the current United States legal test of genericness and methods of
proof, we proposed that the test for genericness should stay centered on
the basic economic rationale for extending legal protection to trade-
marks: the beneficial functions that they perform in the marketplace.
We concluded that when a trademark ceased to perform those benefi-
cial functions, legal protection ought to be denied, even at the expense
of the loss of some goodwill. 74 Under this approach, legal rights
would be determined by analyzing whether market transactions would
proceed more efficiently or less efficiently if the trademark holder were
allowed to retain exclusive use of the mark. 7 5
In focusing on loss of goodwill and the deception test, "Eureka"
and its progeny continued rights to invented or distinctive trademarks
if they retained virtually any source significance, regardless of generic
usage or understanding. United States courts can be criticized for mak-
ing the issue a binary proposition: a word is a valid trademark if the
majority consider it to beprimarily a source-significant term, with the
opposite result if the majority views it as a generic term. t76 The basis
170. See Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1351-52 (citing examples).
171. While we have not extensively analyzed descriptive trademarks from an economic
standpoint, it appears that the transactional efficiency problems they may pose are signifi-
candy less important than those surrounding trademarked generic words.
172. See, ag., sulpra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
174. Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1336, 1359.
175. Id at 1352.
176. Id at 1350-51.
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for this criticism is the fact that the "primary significance" test fails to
take into account that a trademarked word for some consumers may
perform a hybrid function, identifying both the source and the name of
the product.177 The deception rationale prevailing at common law is
an extreme binary proposition: the public, judged as a whole, is either
completely deceived or completely undeceived by the alleged infring-
ing generic use. This test, therefore, is even more flawed.
In most cases involving genericness, a true reflection of how the
trademark functions in the marketplace will involve three categories of
consumers: those for whom the mark is solely source-significant and
not the generic name of the product; those for whom the mark lacks
any source significance and is the generic name of the product; and
those for whom it performs both functions. After identifying these cat-
egories of consumers by means of survey questions or otherwise, we
have suggested that in close cases the effect on consumer search costs
and entry barriers to new firms should be carefully examined. Such an
analysis would include factors such as whether the ultimate buyers are
well-informed, sophisticated purchasers; whether effective alternative
names are available; how the product is marketed; whether the product
is purchased primarily on the basis of experience or test purchases; and
whether invisible product-category attributes or characteristics are as-
sociated with the trademark words. 78 These are questions that courts
applying the deception rationale in genericness cases are not likely to
address for two reasons: first, the deception test is a binary proposition,
and second, the property rights orientation of that test may render
courts insensitive to marketplace realities surrounding trademarked ge-
neric words.'7 9 The "primary significance" test of the United States at
177. Id at 1350, 1352.
178. Id at 1352-53.
179. Only on rare occasions have the Commonwealth courts even mentioned economic
considerations, but there are a few examples. See Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Hanbury,
17 L.T.R. (n.s.) 298, 302 (V.C. 1867) ("However small the difference may appear, yet it is a
well-known thing in commerce that a short name is a matter of considerable importance,
and to call it 'Liebig's extract of meat,' instead of calling it an extract of meat after Liebig's
prescription, would not be of inconsiderable importance with regard to a ready sale in the
market"). In the "Daiquiri Rum" case, Lord Pearce observed:
Daiquiri cocktails had by then become well-known on their own merits, with help
from certain writers of fiction. They were cocktails based on light Cuban rum. To
a large extent the rum used had been BACARDI rum. The trade mark DAI-
QUIRI RUM must obviously be an advantage in promoting the sale of rum for use
in Daiquiri cocktails. When mixing these the mind instinctively leans, and the
hand instinctively reaches, towards the bottle of DAIQUIRI RUM rather than to
the bottle of BACARDI or any other brand. To the sophisticated bar tender or
drinker this impulse may be entirely negatived, if he knows that BACARDI or
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least acknowledges that consumers and competitors can be informa-
tionally handicapped when faced with a trademarked generic word.
The "Eureka" approach contains no such acknowledgment.
B. Trade Versus Public Use and Understanding of Trademarked
Generic Words
Common-law cases in the jurisdictions reviewed have distin-
guished between trade and public use and understanding of trade-
marked generic words."' 0 Such an approach has also been evident in
certain United States decisions, such as Judge Hand's "Aspirin" deci-
sion preserving Bayer's trademark rights in sales to pharmacists and
physicians but not in sales to the general public. 8 Such an approach
has merit. Exclusive rights ought to be evaluated within each relevant
consuming universe, ie., each group of consumers who may tdtimatel,
rely on the trademarked word in making purchasing decisions. This
identifying process is best accomplished by analyzing the potential
sales markets involved, most notably the general public and sophisti-
cated business users, and by ascertaining how the trademark is em-
ployed in marketing the product.'8 2 Some cases in the Commonwealth
jurisdictions, especially with reference to remedies, have been sensitive
to these distinctions in approaching genericness issues.'8 3
other brands are the more usual base, or if he has a view that the latter are quite as
good as or better than DAIQUIRI RUM for the purpose. But when a less sophisti-
cated person mixes Daiquiris behind a bar or buys a bottle of rum so that he can
give his friends Daiquiri cocktails, not only subconscious instinct, but also con-
scious reflection, would seem to indicate that the right choice is DAIQUIRI RUM.
It is not possible to deny the existence of an impulse (whether corrected by sophis-
ticated knowledge or not) to use DAIQUIRI RUM for making Daiquiri cocktails.
Indeed, the proprietors clearly acknowledged and emphasised this impulse when
they laced their opening advertising campaign with constant references to the de-
lights of Daiquiri cocktails.
"Daiquiri Rum" Trade Mark, 1969 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 600, 614 (H.L). See also supra
notes 115-16 and accompanying text (Canadian "Thermos" case).
180. See supra notes 34-35, 38 and accompanying text.
181. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 510, 513-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
182. Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1347-48.
183. See supra notes 59-61 and a6:ompanying text. In Armstrong Oiler Co. v. Patent
Axlebox & Foundry Co., 1910 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 362 (Ch.), the defendant supplied oilers
of their own make when an order was received for an "Armstrong Oiler," which was the
plaintiffs trademark. Although the defendant clearly indicated on the invoice that it was
supplying an "Armstrong Type Oiler," the plaintiff argued that "Armstrong Oiler" was like
"Yorkshire Relish" and should be protected because there were physical differences between
the oilers. Id at 368. The Chancery Division, however, noted that the buyers were sophisti-
cated, limited primarily to railway purchasing agents. According to the court, the defend-
ant's customers understood quite well and expected to receive oilers made by the defendant,
with "Armstrong Oiler" denoting the name of a product. Thus, there was no risk of deceiv-
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The protective provisions of the British, Australian, and New Zea-
land Acts, on the other hand, appear to eliminate a relevant universe
from consideration: the general public. These provisions are consistent
with a manufacturer's interest in developing the most effective advertis-
ing of the product, making its trademark a household word.184 A man-
ufacturer with a registered trademarked generic word, particularly one
who is first in the market, can gain at the expense of other producers.
Such remarkably anticompetitive results were intended.185 But what of
the general consuming public? At first blush, the report from which
those protective provisions are drawn is adequately reasoned: the prac-
tice of the general public cannot be legally controlled, but the practice
in the trade can be controlled by suit, as in the "Eureka" case.'8 6 Nev-
ertheless, a manufacturer has the opportunity to introduce a short and
easily used word along with its trademark so that the probability of the
public adopting the mark as a generic term by natural linguistic ten-
dency is substantially reduced." 7 Manufacturers can and usually do
police their mark for improper usage in the media and dictionaries. 188
Furthermore, elimination of a relevant consuming universe from con-
sideration is diametrically opposed to the fundamental proposition that
trademark protection ought to be coextensive with the beneficial func-
tions that trademarks perform in the marketplace. The effect of these
statutory protective rules is topromote the creation of consumer infor-
mation barriers and to heighten consumer search costs. Like the com-
mon-law "Eureka" approach, these statutory provisions are
ing unwary purchasers. Id at 369. See also Singer Mfg. Co. v. British Empire Mfg. Co.,
1903, R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 313, 319 (Ch.) (to the ordinary purchasers there was nothing
known as the "Singer" system; only known to the inner circle of the trade); Singer Mfg. Co.
v. Loog, 18 Ch. D. 395 (Ch. App. 1879) (sophisticated buyers, tailors and seamstresses), Cf
Elliott Optical Co.'s Application, 1952 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 169, 172 (Ass't Comptroller)
(recognition of limited buying public and their sophistication in refusal to register
"Synotophore" for certain types of optical instruments under the 1938 British Act).
184. "From a marketing point of view, the ideal situation for a trade mark is for it to
become, in the mind of the public, synonymous with the goods. Indeed much advertising is
designed to achieve this end." GUIDEBOOK TO AUSTRALIAN TRADE MARKS LAW (CCH)
703, at 100 (1979). See also Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1337-38 (discussing "free
advertising" effect of public use of a firm's trademark as a generic term).
185. See supra text accompanying note 118.
186. Id See also "Daiquiri Rum" Trade Mark, 1969 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 600, 607 (H.L.)
(argument of counsel).
187. See E. VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE § 6.20 (2d ed. 1968)
(outlining precautionary steps in adopting marks for new products or processes).
188. See J. CALIMAFDE, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5.03 (1970) (sug-
gesting a policing policy).
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extraordinarily biased against the introduction of economic analysis
into the law of trademarked generic words.
Nonetheless, these protective provisions could be read more har-
moniously with the public interest by recognizing that marks can si-
multaneously function as name and source-significant words even to
the trade. Such interpretations would be consistent with a transactional
economic approach and would not necessarily lead to removal of
marks from the register. For example, this approach might preserve
rights to a hybrid mark where there is an adequate alternative name
and the product is low-priced and bought on the basis of test or experi-
ence purchases.
C. Patent-Expiry Rules
One benefit of a patent-expiry rule is that it is clear and easy to
apply. It can aid competitors by relieving them of the burden of show-
ing genericness in cases where it would be unfair to let the inventor
retard competition by inhibiting the use of the accepted name of a
product. On the other hand, the rule has the potential for being over-
inclusive, causing trademark loss when no enhancement of consumer
search costs exists and competitors are not handicapped. Many of the
early patent-expiry cases can be explained in terms of other factors,
such as misuse of the trademarked word by patent holders, failure to
provide an alternative common name to call the product, or blatant
attempts to extend the harvest of economic rewards for patent procure-
ment. One commentator has characterized the rule as an example of
"monopoly fright." 189 Furthermore, the legal fictions embodied in the
theories underlying the patent-expiry rule potentially clash with logic
and justice. In the United States, these fictions led to the development
of various express exceptions to the automatic genericness rule prior to
its complete rejection. 190 The result was a jurisprudential labyrinth
189. L. HOLMQVIST, supra note 9, at 264.
190. See, eg., Mc~lhenny Co. v. Bulliard, 265 F. 705, 710 (W.D. La. 1920) (rule does not
apply where the trademark preceded the patent); Ironite Co. v. Cement Waterproofing &
Ironite Co., 20 F. Supp. 603, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1937) (rule does not apply where the patent,
although validly granted, was later declared invalid before expiration of 17-year grant);
President Suspender Co. v. MacWilliam, 238 F. 159 (2d Cir. 1916) (rule does not apply
where there is another descriptive name in common use by which the public could call the
product); Sanford-Day Iron Works v. Enterprise Foundry & Mach. Works, 130 Tenn. 669,
172 S.W. 537 (1915) (only the name of the patentee becomes generic upon expiration of the
patent, not the name of the manufacturer of the patented product); Buffalo Specialty Co. v.
Van Cleef, 227 F. 391 (7th Cir. 1915) (no application where the patent covered a combina-
tion of elements and the trademark designated the source of one unpatented element);
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which would be best avoided by rejecting common-law or statutory
patent-expiry rules, even those premised upon the existence of effective
alternative names.191
The presence of an expired patent, however, should have some ev-
identiary value in determinations of genericness. Faced with a trade-
marked product under the control of only one source during the patent
period, there is an inference that the public may adopt the trademarked
word as the generic name of the patented product. In circumstances
where no alternative common name has been provided or is available,
this inference should be a strong one.192
The lack of an effective alternative common name is frequently a
problem when trademarked words appear on patented pharmaceuti-
cals. 193 The separate (and different) statutory test in force in New Zea-
land and the United Kingdom for trademarked chemical elements or
compounds displaces the patent-expiry rule and recognizes the central
importance of suitable alternative names. 94 The use of such a test is an
important step in the direction of basing genericness determinations for
trademarked pharmaceuticals on transactional efficiency. It would
seem preferable, however, to retain more flexibility in deciding such
cases than seems possible under these statutory provisions, leaving to
the court the weighing of hybridity, search costs, invisible attributes
associated with the mark, and purchasing patterns (e.g., prescription
drugs versus nonprescription drugs).
D. Remedial Approaches to Trademarked Generic Words
Remedies in genericness cases decided in the Commonwealth
countries and the United States share a common concern: protection of
those for whom the mark functions solely as an indication of source.
United States courts, in cases like Thermos 95 and Cellophane,196 have
worked hard to design remedies to protect that minority of the purchas-
ing public who perceived the trademarked word only as a brand name.
These measures have included requiring competitors to use reasonable
Hughes v. Alfred H. Smith Co., 209 F. 37 (2d Cir. 1913) (no application when different
trademarks for the same patented item are used).
191. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
192. But see I J. GILSON, supra note 1, at § 2.02[3] at 2-21 ("patent coverage raises no
.. . evidentiary advantage whatever").
193. See Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1344 (citing examples).
194. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
195. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
196. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936), cerl.
denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936).
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care to inform the public of the source of the product ("Sylvania's cel-
lophane"),197 restrictions on the use of "original" or "genuine,"' 98 and
restrictions on a competitor's use of capital letters (such as prohibiting
Aladdin from capitalizing "thermos"). 99 Injunctive orders by the
courts of the Commonwealth countries have likewise been concerned
with protecting that minority. Conditional injunctions permitting a
competitor to use the trademarked term if it could adequately distin-
guish its use to prevent deception have often been granted.2° ° It is in
the area of common-law remedies, therefore, that the greatest similarity
between United States and Commonwealth approaches to trademarked
generic words is to be found.
The fundamental difference between these two approaches, how-
ever, is apparent in borderline cases and is a result of the differing legal
standards used to determine genericness. While the United States
courts, at least in some instances, would seek to prevent confusion after
free use of a mark claimed as a trademark is made available, they also
recognize that some confusion is still likely to result. In such instances,
as the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has ob-
served, "[a] certain amount of purchaser confusion may even be toler-
ated in order to give the public the advantages of free competition." 20'
In contrast, the Commonwealth jurisdictions tip the balance in the
ether direction. The risk is placed on competitors that any significant
confusion will result in infringement or unfair competition. 2
Implicit in the legal tests and remedial approaches used by the
Commonwealth courts is the dominance of the concept of protecting a
firm's goodwill. In a number of cases, the courts have expressed con-
cern about the fact that not only would the plaintiff lose trade custom,
but also that the plaintiff's reputation would be damaged by the de-
fendant selling inferior goods. In the "Yorkshire Relish" case, for ex-
ample, the court noted on several occasions that the article was not
identical, but only substantially identical.1
3
197. Id
198. See, eg., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir.
1963).
199. Id
200. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
201. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
202. See, eg., Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 54, 79 (Ch.
App.), appealdismissed, 1897 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 720 (H.L.) ("The defendants have had full
warning of the difficulties ... and of the risk they would run if they attempted to do what
they have in fact done. They have deliberately tried an experiment and it has failed").
203. 1897 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. at 728-29, 731-32.
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The tension in the situations posed in the "Yorkshire Relish" and
other cases arises from the hybrid nature of the mark-it is a name and
has source-significance-which carries with it the quality assurance of
a properly functioning trademark.2° If in fact the mark impedes rather
than promotes efficient transactions, careful remedial measures are the
best method for balancing the public's interest in competition and the
public's need to identify particular products of a certain quality by
shorthand means. If the alleged infringing use is outside the product
category, as in the "Angostura Bitters" case where the bitters were com-
pletely different in taste and color,20 5 use of the term ought to be en-
joined. On the other hand, competition on the merits ought to prevail
when the products are substantially identical.20 6 In the latter case, pro-
vided the bottles and labels are substantially different, some experien-
tial education and risk on the part of the public may be justified. The
public will learn, for example, to recognize the difference between "The
Celebrated Yorkshire Relish Prepared and Sold by Goodwill, Back-
house & Co." and the "Yorkshire Relish Manufactured by the Bir-
mingham Vinegar Brewery Co. Ltd."
The "Corona" injunction presents a special case where the court
attempted to deal with the problem of an ambiguous oral request. 20 7 It
was ambiguous because for some persons the word was a product
name, for others it had no source significance, and for still others it
performed a dual function simultaneously identifying not only a type
of cigar but also a specific brand.2 8 Remedially, "Corona" may repre-
sent a viable approach to the special problems associated with oral
transactions and hybrid trademarked words. But such injunctions
should be adopted as a proper solution only after a full consideration
of the transactional situation. Is a cigar smoker really likely to be
deceived if a waiter brings a different brand? Are the cigars marked
with any form of brand identification, such as a cigar band? Is the
204. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
205. Siegert v. Findlater, 7 Ch. D. 801 (1878).
206. See, e.g., Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. Summerskill, 1916 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas, 63,
67 (H.L.) (no passing off even though the public, when they asked for "Malted Milk," had
always received plaintiffs brand during the preceding 26 years; plaintiff unsuccessfully ar-
gued that defendant's article was different because plaintiff used a secret process), Cf
Canham v. Jones, 85 Eng. Rep. 302 (Ch. 1813) (no action lies when defendant represents not
that he sells plaintiffs unpatented medicine, "Velno's Vegetable Syrup," but "one of &s a
good a quality"; plaintiff had purchased the "secret recipe" from the prior maker; defendant
was the prior maker's former employee).
207. Havana Cigar & Tobacco Factories Ltd. v. Oddenino, 1923 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas, 47,
51 (C.A.).
208. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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practical effect of such an order to encourage harassing threats or litiga-
tion effectively forcing restaurants to supply only "Corona Coronas"?
Could such policing of trademarks facilitate monopolization or at-
tempts to monopolize?20 9
Finally, neither United States nor Commonwealth statutory reme-
dies in proceedings concerning genericness allow the kind of flexibility
exhibited by the courts. Cancellation or rectification of trademark re-
gistries appears to be an all or nothing proposition.210 Such inflexibility
has caused trademark authorities to hesitate to remove exclusive trade-
mark rights to admittedly generic words.21' Moreover, such inflexibil-
ity ignores the marketplace functions of trademarks and deters the use
of analyses of transactional efficiencies in the design of remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
The authors have previously criticized the sweeping generaliza-
tions employed in American cases212 on trademarked generic words for
lack of consideration of important economic questions. Whatever the
shortcomings of American law, however, they pale into insignificance
when the state of the law in these foreign jurisdictions is considered.
Much of the law in Australia, Canada, Britain, and New Zealand has
yet to emerge from the nineteenth century. No significant considera-
tion is given to basic economic analysis of search costs, hybridity, or
relevant consuming universes. Moreover, the law fails to recognize that
consumers and competitors can encounter serious difficulties when
faced with trademarked generic words. Protection of business goodwill
is the predominant value in these jurisdictions, to the exclusion of vir-
tually all other considerations. Most notably, the protective statutory
provisions of all Commonwealth countries except Canada effectively
insulate trademarked generic words from cancellation. This compara-
tive study of the law of trademarked generic words leads to the conclu-
sion that economic analysis has much to offer these foreign
jurisdictions.
209. See Eaton, What's In a Trade Name, in PRACTISING LAW INST., CouRsE HAND-
BOOK No. 141, GENERIC TRADEMARKS 77 (1981). See also Folsom & Teplyisura note 2, at
1345.
210. See Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1355 & n.137. See also .rupra notes 121-23 and
accompanying text.
211. See, ag., supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (Canadian "Thermos"
decision).
212. Folsom & Teply, supra note 2, at 1333-34.
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